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Magnus Hörnqvist, Risk, Power and the State: After Foucault (Abingdon, UK: Rout-
ledge, 2010), ISBN: 978-0415547680 
 
This book has a theoretically bracing “Introduction” and “Conclusion” that sandwich four 
empirically rich chapters: case studies of Sweden’s employment service (chapter 1), prison 
system (chapters 2 and 3), and customs service (chapter 4).  Don’t let that national focus 
mislead.  Fewer than half of the almost 300 sources are Swedish, and those give us on-the-
ground data; most citations are English-language social science and social theory, including 
15 Foucault books and collections in translation.  (Risk, Power and the State: After Foucault is 
written in English). 
Given that Foucault precipitated “something of a Copernican revolution in the study 
of power,” (153) Hörnqvist aims high: to critically extend and supplement the Foucault 
tradition, (160) especially “the governmentality school.” (27)  He wants to reveal a more 
complex concept of power through the “entwinement” of the exercises of productive and 
repressive powers in (state) organizations.  If anchored in the legal paradigm, Hörnqvist 
thinks his ambition cannot be realized.  Hence “risk” replaces the juridical model’s binary 
(permissible/impermissible) with a negotiated and contested continuum of heterogeneous 
factors.  Intra- and inter-organizational communications about risk develop “strategies” 
that shape the exercise of power.  And here is one of Hörnqvist’s most interesting themes.  
The entwinement of productive and repressive powers occurs not only at three levels but 
also between levels. 
The architecture of the four case studies explains the latter point.  Each has 
introductory and concluding summaries, but the core of each is identically titled sections: 
“setting the target,” “targeting,” “staying on target.”  Initially, targets are non-members of 
the organizations: the unemployed, the incarcerated, international travelers.  At the second 
level, members of the organization who exercise power, who fulfill the targeting, are 
themselves targeted by the organization to enhance efficiency.  Finally, at the third level, 
extra-organizational agencies of the state, as well as non-state forces such as mass media, 
target the organization as such to keep it on target.  (This level, understandably, gets only 
occasional and cursory treatment.) 
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How do entwined powers circulate between the unemployed and members of the 
employment service?  At level 1, case managers exercise productive and repressive powers 
to more strongly motivate the unemployed to fulfill the conditions of receiving benefits.  At 
level 2, since a “lack of motivation to control on the part of case managers was comparable 
with the lack of motivation to apply for available positions on the part of the unemployed,” 
(53) then case managers were “incorporated into a high-tech panopticon” (54) to more 
effectively fulfill the organization’s aims.  At both levels, “[r]epressive power takes on fea-
tures of productive power, and vice versa.  Repressive power can produce specific acts and 
skills...  And productive power can increase the motivation to work negatively through the 
threat of training.” (61)  At level 3, audits of the employment service by external agencies 
assess it “in terms of rule compliance *repressive power+ as well as performance *produc-
tive power].  The two aspects are not always kept separate in contemporary audit practice.” 
(62)  Thus, entwined powers are exercised by level 3 upon level 2, by level 2’s organization 
upon its members, and by level 2 upon level 1. 
A similar story, but longer and more complex, could be told about Swedish prisons 
(66 of the 162 pages concern prisons).  Very briefly, in chapter 2 we find, for example, that 
when prisoners are trained to have more pro-social behaviors and attitudes with an eye to 
employment upon release, “the panopticon has turned on the prison guards” so that they 
will better “adhere to the *training+ manual and not improvise.” (90)  Chapter 3, the most 
developed, discusses “the dual interests of the prison service,” (109) its conflicting obliga-
tions to rehabilitate (productive power) and to maintain order (repressive power).  Since the 
risks of reoffending and of misconduct “are, with few exceptions, not kept separate,” (118) 
then “indicators of risk are transformed into directives for decision-making...  [and] what 
directs the power is the same, irrespective of whether it is being exercised” at level 1 or 
level 2.  (128) 
The case study of the (airport) customs service is the least successful in terms of 
Hörnqvist’s stated aims and methods.  Indeed, the problems with this fourth chapter reflect 
inconsistencies and ambiguities of the previous three.  Neither entwinement nor circulation 
of power between travelers and agents occur in customs interventions.  More significantly, 
targets are not set at level 1: border inspectors have virtually unlimited discretion to 
“control” anyone at any time.  (131f, 141)  Furthermore, while inspectors’ efficiency is never 
audited the organization’s may be, but only indirectly.  (147f) 
These targeting failures expose flaws not only in Hörnqvist’s theory of the organized 
exercise of entwined powers, but also in the case-study architecture.  We ought to have 
been more concerned when we learned that the employment service “operates without a 
precise conception of the target group.” (34)  Although “employability became a target” (39) 
that was taken to mean “appropriate appearance,” (48) the result was that those “charac-
teristics themselves [were] at best only marginally affected.” (49)  For the prisons, “at the 
level of theory, the target area for interventions remains vague... [because] the concept of 
anti-sociality is never defined as such.” (73)  In chapter 3, Hörnqvist concedes that targeting 
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the risks of prison disorder did not yield a strategy of “effective risk management.” (109ff)  
So there was no level-1 exercise of productive power, a fortiori no entwinement. 
Part of Hörnqvist’s dissatisfaction with Foucauldian discussions of productive 
power is that they engage in “speculative arguments” (156) about how power creates sub-
jects, citizens, discourses and so on.  “If we want a more direct route to the effects of power, 
[Hörnqvist] suggest[s] a focus on behaviour rather than on what is supposed to underlie 
behaviour.  On this reading, power produces actions in accordance with a set target.” (156)  
If targeting is problematic, the “focus on behaviour” is even more so.  Since “[i]ndividual 
action plans could be said to primarily target the motivation of the unemployed,” (50; see 
also 41) then Hörnqvist’s object of inquiry is not behavior but what underlies it.  Again, 
audits of prison rehabilitation strategies “do not cover the conduct of the target group out-
side the prison, and cannot say whether the interventions meet the target in terms of en-
during behaviour modification.” (92)  Hörnqvist notes this general problem in the “Intro-
duction,” only to pass over it: his object of study is not behavior at levels 1 and 2 but rather 
documents that “are part of the process of exercising power.” (27) 
For all his suggestive, theoretical remarks and fascinating, informative case studies, 
Hörnqvist does not construct “a more complex notion” of power. (154)  Articulating the 
entwinement of repressive and productive powers undercuts the need for a new concept.  
Even Hörnqvist’s important claim that considerations of risk should move us to modify the 
Foucauldian model (which, he claims, relies on a legal paradigm) may not be that far-
reaching as criticism.  For analyses of strategies of power oriented by risk are similar to 
genealogies of practices of power however oriented.  Key is the notion of practices.  Hörn-
qvist claims that “Foucault has little to say about the transition” from the level of contested 
and unstable power relations to levels where those relations are regularly reproduced. (6)  
But citing Dreyfus and Rabinow,1 Hörnqvist apparently misunderstands the concept of 
practices.  Genealogies of practices already show both why the reproduction of social struc-
tures is not guaranteed and how “the actual reproduction of institutionalized power rela-
tions” proceeds. (7)  If “Strategies are where action meets structure,” (17) practices are 
where action, structure, and strategy intersect.  Hörnqvist’s supplements to the study of 
power give us plenty to think about, just not always in the ways he wants. 
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